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the cogent philosophical insights proffered in this volume. Abe knows how to 
create clarity and lucidity in what is probably some of the most difficult and 
elusive thought in any philosophical literature, West or East. We can be 
grateful that there is someone who can interpret these extremely difficult and 
important ideas and who also has a sound knowledge of Christianity and 
Western philosophy.
Joan Stambaugh
THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF NISHITANI KEIJI: En­
counter with Emptiness. Edited by Taitetsu Unno. Nanzan Studies in 
Religion and Culture, James W. Heisig, General Editor. Berkeley, CA: 
Asian Humanities Press, 1989, xv + 350 pp. ISBN 0-89581-871-1
THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF TANABE HAJIME: The 
Metanoetic Imperative. Edited by Taitetsu Unno and James W. Heisig. 
Nanzan Studies in Religion and Culture, James W. Heisig, General 
Editor. Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1990, xiii 4- 399 pp. 
ISBN 0-89581-873-8
These two volumes (henceforth abbreviated as RPNK and RPTH), collec­
tions of papers coming out of international symposia on the thought of 
Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990) and Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) respectively, 
draw attention to the significance of the Kyoto School and its contribution to 
world philosophy. They also further the conversation already going on in 
some circles on the issues raised by and about this religio-philosophical cur­
rent, notably since the publication of English translations of major works of 
the two religious philosophers (Nishitani’s ShakyO to wa nanika, published as 
Religion and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van Bragt, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1982, and Tanabe’s ZangedO toshite no tetsugaku, pub­
lished as Philosophy as Metanoetics, trans. Takeuchi Yoshinori, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986).
The publication of the above mentioned translations, as well as the prepara­
tion of the symposia (held at Smith College, Massachusetts, in 1984 and 1989) 
and now the publication of the collections of papers based on these, are in 
great part due to the initiative and efforts of the Nanzan Institute of Religion 
and Culture (based at Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan) under the director-
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ships of Jan Van Bragt and James W. Heisig.
Space does not allow us to take a detailed critical look at the individual 
papers in both volumes, many of which raise important issues, as this would 
produce another book-length manuscript by itself, so we will focus on three 
questions concerning Absolute Nothingness, the pivotal term in both 
Nishitani’s and Tanabe’s religious philosophies, as our way of assessing the 
thrust of the two volumes.
a) How Can One “Know” Absolute Nothingness?
The most scathing criticism of Nishitani’s thought and of the Kyoto School 
as a whole in the English language that has come to the attention of this 
reviewer so far is Paul Griffith’s paper, “On the Future of Buddhist-Christian 
Interaction” (see Minoru Kiyota, ed., Japanese Buddhism: Its Tradition, New 
Religions, and Interaction with Christianity, Tokyo/Los Angeles: Buddhist 
Books International, 1987, pp. 145-61). Griffiths criticizes Nishitani’s posi­
tion, calling it “esotericist-triumphalist,” in that, locating the essence of 
religion in the experience of the individual, Nishitani banks everything upon 
this experience, and according to Griffiths, “seems almost completely unaware 
of the need to offer arguments to support what he says.” (p. 157)
Unfortunately, none of the papers in RPNK has taken the trouble to res­
pond to Griffiths’ critique in a way that would at least elucidate Nishitani’s 
true position vis-St-vis the above accusations. The papers in the collection, 
with one or two exceptions, generally take a sympathetic stance toward their 
subject matter and develop their arguments already presupposing such a 
stance “from within.” This is perhaps most expected and unobjectionable, 
also given the invitational nature of the symposium out of which the collection 
arose. However, leaving Griffith’s criticisms unaddressed only widens the rift 
between the “converted” on the one hand, and on the other, those who are 
still struggling with terminology used by Nishitani (not to mention Tanabe 
and other Kyoto School writers) that is unfamiliar to many Western readers.
Sten H. Stenson’s paper (RPNK, pp. 114-42) comes closest to addressing 
this question of the epistemological grounds of Nishitani’s Absolute 
Nothingness. Rather than taking Nishitani to be expounding a propositional 
truth “about something called Absolute Nothingness,” Stenson suggests that 
we can liken Nishitani to the legendary bird that sings because “it has a song 
to sing.” (pp. 141-42) What is called for then is a stance of openness to listen 
to that song of the bird, rather than one that would want to catch that bird or 
classify it into genus and species and describe its color, shape, etc.
Taking Stenson’s hint, one may then venture that the attempt to “know” 
Absolute Nothingness in a way that relies solely on propositional language is 
one that is doomed from the start, due to the very nature of what we are deal-
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ing with. We are in other words confronted with a question that cuts right 
through our very being as a thinking and knowing subject, a question that in* 
vites a stance of listening from the depths of our being, rather than a discur­
sive pursuit that would lead to logically coherent and certain conclusions open 
to verifiability or falsifiability.
To hear the song of the bird, however faintly, is also to be called and 
challenged, by something of an inner exigency, to make that song more and 
more audible, to oneself, no less than to others. Philosophical discourse can 
thus be understood as an endeavor that can pave the way for the hearing of the 
song, in posing the basic questions, carrying out tasks of critical reflection, 
clarifying concepts used, sorting out of the issues involved, etc.
Such an endeavor by itself counters the charge of esotericism, as it lays itself 
open to public scrutiny and proceeds in a rationally coherent and 
demonstrable way as far as it can. That is, up to the point where, having ex­
hausted reason to its limits and recognizing these very limits, one is led to stop 
and listen and invite the conversation partner likewise to listen in silence, lest 
one drown out the song in futile chatter. It can overcome the attitude of trium­
phalism, precisely in humbly recognizing its own limits, and letting this 
recognition become the basis for genuine metanoia that will in turn open the 
way to a renewed vitality of reason, in the way, for example, that Tanabe sets 
out for us.
b) How Can Absolute Nothingness Ground Right Action?
We come now to an issue, raised or touched upon in different ways, by 
many of the papers in the two volumes, incorporating many aspects and cor­
ollary issues (such as the relationships between the absolute and the relative, 
ontology and axiology, individual and social transformation, eternity and 
history, etc.): can the realization of Absolute Nothingness ground Right Ac­
tion in the historical world? And if so, how? This is a key question upon 
which we dare say the viability of the whole Kyoto School hinges.
The sections on Ethics and on History in RPNK, and the section on Society 
in RPTH include papers specifically meant to address this issue. A reading of 
these will give us the different angles, which we will not enumerate here, from 
which a negative answer seems inevitable, despite all the dialectics about “emp- 
tiness-s/ve-compassion,” “nothingness-qrua-Iove” offered in the apologetics 
of Absolute Nothingness. David Little’s paper (RPNK, pp. 181-87) in par­
ticular is most eloquent in outlining inherent difficulties in relating Absolute 
Nothingness to a viable ethical stance that would meet the challenges of our 
contemporary world.
On an ad hominem level, which can be a more persuasive one for many of 
us than all the theoretical arguments that can be mustered on paper, the
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ethical lapse of noted persons supposed to have been embodiments of that 
* * real self-realization of reality ” militates against a positive answer to whether 
Absolute Nothingness grounds ethical action. The accusation of complicity 
with and cooptation by Japanese imperialistic nationalistic propagandists in 
prewar times leveled against prominent Kyoto School members, for example, 
has often been raised, and continues to be a stumbling block. In more recent 
times, the sexual and financial scandals associated with renowned meditation 
teachers in the Western hemisphere also raise questions about the “ethics of 
enlightenment.”
But perhaps we can overlook examples of individual failures, or join others 
in glossing over the past and in refusing to consider it at all in assessing the 
viability, the contribution of the Kyoto School to world culture and 
philosophy. It is then the actual and living response of its current proponents 
to the various contemporary issues facing the global community, rather than 
the way they argue out the theoretical possibilities or modes of historical 
engagement from the standpoint of Absolute Nothingness, that would be the 
gauge of such viability.
In other words, the “emptying of emptiness in history,” “absolute media­
tion in historical events,” “the return to the world (gensO) from the stand­
point of Absolute Nothingness,” awaits genuine real-ization (hyphen em­
phasized), not only in scientific, artistic, cultural and other events in our 
historical life, as Kawamura Eiko aptly demonstrates (RPTH, pp. 223-34), 
but more significantly at this point of our history, in the face of the vital 
ethical issues that have to do with our very survival as Earth community— 
issues of economic injustice, of physical and structural violence wrought upon 
individuals and communities throughout our globe, of ecological destruction, 
issues of human, animal, and Earth rights, etc.
The question can perhaps be rephrased in a double-edged way: what does 
the standpoint of Absolute Nothingness have to do with such “mundane” 
issues? And here is where a dilemma comes to the fore. To answer in the 
negative, i.e., “No, it has nothing to do with such issues,” is to make it cease 
to be Absolute Nothingness. Such an answer misconstrues or fails to ap­
preciate its dynamic nature that also embraces the relative, that empties itself 
into the historical. On the other hand, to answer positively, i.e., “Yes, it must 
have something to do with such issues,” would tend to reduce this standpoint 
to a moralistic position, again regressing to the standpoint of opposition of 
“good vs. evil,” and would also thus make it cease to be Absolute 
Nothingness.
The challenge to the proponents of the Kyoto School then would be in the 
grounding of a resounding “Yes” that does not thereby regress into a mere 
moralism based on the traditional oppositions of “good vs. evil.” The precise 
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way of real-izing the unity of ontology and axiology, the unity of the absolute 
and the relative, or the non-opposition of nirvana and samsara, etc., in the 
context of the concrete issues facing Earth community as outlined above, re* 
mains an open and ongoing and rather crucial task, not only in its theoretical 
formulation, but more so, in its actual praxis in the real world especially by 
those who speak and write about these issues. To put it in rather simplistic 
terms, “don’t talk of nothingness-^ua-love, show me.”
c) Does Absolute Nothingness Engender Hope?
This third question on the prospects of the Kyoto School is raised also in a 
double-edged way. The first level has in mind the nihilism impinging upon the 
human condition since modem times, the backdrop against which Nishitani 
wrote his Religion and Nothingness. And Nishitani’s whole project is precisely 
to elucidate the path that would overcome the nihilism plaguing modern 
humanity, i.e., the path of negation of this nihilism in the realization of Ab­
solute Nothingness. Needless to say, following the intricacies of Nishitani’s 
thinking leads us to an affirmative answer to our question. The further elucida­
tion of this affirmative answer in the light of related questions and issues re­
mains an ongoing task, and the RPNK collection is indeed a valuable contribu­
tion in this regard.
However, it is a second level of meaning in the above question that concerns 
us here. With Absolute Nothingness understood as the overcoming of linear 
time, that is, time as present receding from past moving toward the future, 
and as the realization of the dimension of eternity, the paradoxical statement 
can be made that, from the standpoint of Absolute Nothingness, there is no 
room for hope. There is no longer hope, precisely because everything is real­
ized: each moment is, as Abe Masao explains, a “monad of eternity.” Such is 
a view of the end of history that can be called “absolutely realized escha­
tology,” in Abe’s terms (RPNK, p. 302)
But this is precisely where a major pitfall lurks, not unrelated to what we 
considered on the grounding of ethical action: from such a lofty standpoint 
where each moment is a “monad of eternity,” there is no longer any sense in 
talking of success nor failure, attainment nor non-attainment, etc.— 
everything is already fulfilled! This is indeed in keeping with the dialectic of 
negation and super-affirmation in Mahayana Buddhism. But the pitfail is in 
the attitude: if everything is realized, then what is the point of striving? And 
taken in a one-dimensional way, here we have the classic expression of what is 
known as hongaku shisO or the doctrine of original enlightenment, at its 
worst. Lai (RPTH, pp. 256-76) and Hubbard (RPTH, pp. 360-79) have 
pointed this out for us in their respective papers, and the latter’s charge of “ab­




This attitude comes as a result of clinging to the idea of Absolute 
Nothingness, and thereby losing it as a living and dynamic reality that negates 
all ideas, even about itself. We have seen degenerative tendencies, such as the 
neglect of practice, lax moral behavior, etc., as results of this attitude, in the 
history of Buddhism, and all this serves as a caution against taking the mere 
idea of Absolute Nothingness and making it an ideological buttress for certain 
kinds of attitude or behavior.
What we call Absolute Nothingness can only be the living and dynamic reali­
ty that it is, as it continually acts as a critical principle that radically negates 
everything we tend to idealize or idolize, whether these be things or persons, 
or concepts such as God or Absolute Nothingness. The continuation of the 
discourse and dialectic reflected in RPNK and RPTH is one, though not the 
only, way of keeping it a living and dynamic reality.
Finally, some comments on particular aspects of the two volumes are in 
keeping.
The essays in the section on God in RPNK, solicited for the volume after 
the original symposium “to provide answers to the inevitable question concer­
ning the relationship between emptiness and God” (Editor's Introduction, p. 
x), present liberal Protestant perspectives, and do provide insightful material 
for further Buddhist-Christian dialogue. However, the inclusion of represen­
tatives of a wider range of Christian approaches, for example, those who are 
able to delve into the riches of the tradition on “the analogy of being,” or into 
Patristic sources, and to engage these in the dialectics of Absolute Nothing­
ness, would provide a broader base for ongoing conversations and would 
undoubtedly open new dimensions.
The section entitled “Society” in RPTH raised the greatest expectations, 
but was a disappointment to this reviewer. With the exception of Himi 
Kiyoshi’s essay, the other papers placed under this section seem to belong 
elsewhere. One would have hoped that the authors of the papers in this section 
would ask pertinent questions and struggle with these in giving the reader a 
more well-rounded picture of the strengths as well as the limitations of 
Tanabe's metanoetic philosophy in relation to Society, an issue parallel to that 
of Nishitani’s Absolute Nothingness in relation to history. For example, 
Tanabe's explorations of fraternity as a notion that can balance off the ex­
cesses based on the pursuits of liberty on the one hand and of egalitt on the 
other (characterizing capitalistic and socialistic models of society, respect­
ively), and as a principle that can provide the foundations for the reconstruc­
tion of human society on a metanoetic basis, could have been addressed by 
one or other of the papers as a key contribution of Tanabe’s to a vision of the 




There are some minor points to be noted in the interests of Buddhist scholar­
ship. Thomas Kasulis’ assertion that “Yogficara schools advocate a return to 
the buddha-womb (tathagata-garbha) or store-house consciousness (alaya- 
vijnana')" (RPNK, p. 262) is a misstatement of the intent of the Yog&cfira. 
Johannes Laube’s paper (RPTH, pp. 316-39) is subject to historical impreci- 
sions, such as taking “the Pili canon as the oldest source of Buddhist 
literature” (RPTH, p. 322), identifying “Hlnayflna” with “Theravada,” giv­
ing a one-dimensional and inadequate picture of the development of the 
bodhisattva ideal (which he derives from a single reference source), etc.
Ueda Yoshifumi’s article (translated from the Japanese by Taitetsu Unno) 
makes a valuable note for readers of Tanabe’s Philosophy as Metanoetics: 
“action-faith-witness” is a mistranslation if referring to Shinran’s gyO-shin- 
shot which is better rendered as “practice-entrusting-enlightenment” (cf. 
RPTH, p. 140), although we can concede, as Ueda does, that the former 
translation opens new nuances in Tanabe’s cases as his thought is transplanted 
into a different linguistic context.
Some notes concerning the editing/proofreading of RPTH: Langdon 
Gilkey’s paper is entitled “Tanabe and the Philosophy of Religion,” but the 
headers throughout the remaining pages (pp. 73-85) read “Tanabe’s Contribu­
tions to East-West Dialogue.” Heisig’s second paper (pp. 277-90) cites 
“TCW” for Tanabe’s Collected Works in the footnotes, but this is listed in 
the list of abbreviations as THZ. This same paper lists a note number 28 in the 
text (p. 289, 1.22) without a corresponding footnote. SSZ (ShinshQ ShOgyO 
Zensho) is cited as a source in footnotes in Unno’s and Ueda’s papers, but is 
not listed in the abbreviation table.
Finally, concerning both volumes, the use of gender-inclusive language, not 
just to conform to demands of “political correctness,” but precisely to ad­
dress an imbalance in our consciousness, needs to be considered if further edi­
tions of the volumes are planned.
RUBEN L. F. Habito
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